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and the INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION * 
OF UTAH, * 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the appellants Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari should be denied because it does not satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 46(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
2. Whether the appellant's Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari should be denied because it does not satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 46(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION 
The Utah Court of Appeals' opinion in this case, Ashcroft v. 
Industrial Commission, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993), is attached 
hereto as Addendum "A." 
UTAH SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review a Petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-
2(3)(a) (1992), 78-2-2(5) (1992), and Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutes which govern the Utah Supreme Court's 
acceptance of and deliberation upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari are Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) (1992) and 
78-2-2(5) (1992), as well as Rule 45 and Rule 46 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. These provisions (attached hereto 
as Addendum "B") indicate that the Supreme Court's certiorari 
jurisdiction can be utilized to review decisions of the Utah 
Court of Appeals, but not decisions of Utah's administrative 
tribunals, when the following circumstances are present: 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a 
matter of right, but of judicial discretion, 
and will be granted only for special and 
important reasons. The following, while 
neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the 
character of reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with the decision of 
another panel of the Court of 
Appeals on the same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided a question of 
2 
state or federal law in a way that 
is in conflict with the decision of 
the Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision 
that has so far departed from the 
accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a 
lower court as to call for an 
exercise of the Supreme Court's 
power of supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has 
decided an important question of 
municipal, state or federal law 
which has not been, but should be, 
settled by the Supreme Court. 
[Emphasis added.] 
(See Rule 4 6 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure attached 
hereto as Addendum "B.") 
Contrary to the contentions raised on page 2 of the 
appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Utah Code Ann. § 35-
1-77 (1988) and Utah Industrial Commission Rule R568-1-9(A) 
(which deal with the Industrial Commission's use of medical 
panels) are not "controlling statutes" pertinent to the Utah 
Supreme Court's review of the Certiorari Petition. The Court of 
Appeals properly refused to even address whether the aforesaid 
statute and rule have any applicability to the appellant's 
assignment of Industrial Commission error. The Court's Ashcroft 
decision, attached as Addendum "A," simply affirms the Industrial 
Commission's ruling that the appellant failed to come forward 
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with competent medical evidence in support of his claim of an 
impairment rating greater than 5%. Accordingly, the appellant's 
Certiorari Petition is nothing more than an attempt to 
demonstrate that the Court of Appeals somehow committed serious 
error in affirming the Industrial Commission's evidentiary 
rulings. Nowhere does the appellant's Certiorari Petition come 
close to demonstrating such error. Rather, the appellant focuses 
on § 35-1-77 and R568-1-9, and thereby improperly asks the 
Supreme Court to conduct a de novo review of the Industrial 
Commission's Final Order rather than an analysis of the Court of 
Appeals' opinion. His Certiorari Petition, therefore, fails to 
address the Rule 46 considerations deemed pertinent by the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and 
Disposition Below. 
The above-entitled action derives from an industrial 
accident that occurred on September 25, 1989. (R. I.)1 
Following Mr. Ashcroft's industrial injury, he and the appellees 
entered into a Compensation Agreement which included a 
xThe designation "R. 1." refers to page 1 of the record on 
appeal transmitted by the Industrial Commission to the Utah Court 
of Appeals. 
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Stipulation indicating that Mr. Ashcroft had sustained a 5% 
permanent impairment due to his industrial accident. (See the 
parties' Compensation Agreement attached hereto as Addendum "C.") 
Following settlement of the claim, Mr. Ashcroft decided that 
he would ask the Industrial Commission to increase his permanent 
impairment rating and award him additional compensation and 
medical expense benefits. (R. 1.) After the submission of 
numerous medical records, and an Industrial Commission hearing 
conducted by Administrative Law Judge Lisa-Michele Church, an 
Order was entered denying the relief sought by Mr. Ashcroft. 
(R. 39.) (See the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order attached hereto as Addendum MD.fl) 
Mr. Ashcroft then filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial 
Commission (R. 47.) In his Motion, Mr. Ashcroft argued (without 
reference to any evidence contrary to his position) that the 
relief he had requested was generally supported by "objective 
evidence." He also argued that the administrative law judge had 
committed prejudicial error in failing to submit the case to a 
medical panel when the medical evidence contained a supposed 
conflict between physicians' impairment ratings. Following its 
consideration of the record evidence, the Industrial Commission 
correctly found that no medical evidence conflict existed, and 
the Commission affirmed the administrative law judge's Order. 
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(R. 64.) (See the Industrial Commission's final Order attached 
hereto as Addendum "E.") 
Mr. Ashcroft then appealed the Industrial Commission's final 
Order (R. 69), and filed a Rule 10 Motion for Summary Disposition. 
(R. 106.) The Rule 10 Motion was denied. Following oral argument 
on the merits of the case, the Court of Appeals upheld the 
Industrial Commission's refusal to use a medical panel on the 
grounds that the appellant failed to come forward with competent 
medical evidence which could have justified referral of the evidence 
to a medical panel. (See Addendum "A.") The Court also concluded 
that the Industrial Commission erred when it used the phrase 
"substantial evidence" in reviewing the Administrative Law Judge's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. Accordingly, the 
case was remanded to the Industrial Commission so that the 
appropriate "preponderance of evidence" standard of review could be 
applied. 
B. Statement of Background Facts. 
As a preliminary matter, appellees should point out that the 
"Statement of Facts" contained in the applicant's Certiorari Brief 
are not the facts which were adopted by the Industrial Commission or 
by the Court of Appeals. In the Statement of Facts outlined below, 
appellees present the pertinent facts as found by the Industrial 
Commission and as relied upon by the Court of Appeals. 
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On September 25, 1989, Mr. Ashcroft sustained an industrial 
injury while unloading freight from a truck. (R. 1.) 
Mr. Ashcroft promptly reported his injury and left work to seek 
medical treatment. 
In the emergency room, x-rays were taken, and Mr. Ashcroft was 
given muscle relaxants and pain medication. (No medical records are 
available from this visit.) Mr. Ashcroft then consulted with Dr. 
McGregor, his family physician, on September 28, 1989. (R. 130.) 
Dr. McGregor continued to see Mr. Ashcroft for two months. (R. 
130.) Dr. McGregor's records indicate a diagnosis of bulging 
disc/spinal stenosis and refer the applicant to Dr. Bliss, a 
neurosurgeon. (R. 13 0.) 
Dr. Bliss saw Mr. Ashcroft on October 20, 1989, and diagnosed 
". . . central disc herniation with minor spinal stenosis at this 
level." He recommended conservative treatment. (R. 146.) In 
December, 1989, Dr. Bliss noted Mr. Ashcroft's continuing bilateral 
leg pain and reviewed his myelogram and CT scan. (R. 150.) Dr. 
Bliss diagnosed " . . . sciatica-like symptoms with central disc 
herniation and no definite evidence of neural impingement." Mr. 
Ashcroft was then referred to Dr. Moress for a neurological consult. 
(R. 150.) 
Dr. Moress saw Mr. Ashcroft on February 1, 1990 and recommended 
a complete myelography. (R. 155.) Dr. Bliss reviewed this 
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recommendation and noted " . . . MRI scan of c. spine demonstrates 
multilevel disc disease. [Emphasis added.] Previous lumbar 
myelogram and CT scan demonstrated multiple level bulging discs 
without definite stenosis. [Emphasis added.]11 (R. 151.) Later in 
the same report, Dr. Bliss states, "patient clearly interprets all 
of his problems as stemming from his recent accident although 
multiple level disc disease indicates that he has had pre-existing 
problems and in addition, back pain is not his major complaint at 
this time. [Emphasis added.]" (R. 151.) 
On February 2, 1990, in response to an inquiry from the State 
Vocational Rehabilitation Office, Dr. Bliss described 
Mr. Ashcroft's status as "medically stable for return to limited 
employment in nonlaboring activity." (R. 153.) Further, 
Mr. Ashcroft testified at his May 19, 1992 Industrial Commission 
hearing that he had applied for unemployment benefits in late 1989. 
(R. 41.) 
On April 12, 1989, Mr. Ashcroft consulted another orthopedic 
physician, Dr. Neal Capel. Dr. Capel recommended a program of 
conditioning for Mr. Ashcroft. (R. 158.) 
On May 10, 1990, Dr. Capel described a visit 
Mr. Ashcroft had made to the emergency room for intrascapular pain 
and noted, " . . . [t]he most likely explanation is an anxiety 
reaction with somatization." (R. 159.) Dr. Capel continued to 
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recommend swimming, bicycle riding and general conditioning, noting 
that Mr. Ashcroft was to begin an architectural drafting course at 
Dixie College on May 22, 1990. (R. 159.) 
Dr. Capel's June 5, 1990 office note states, " . . . [t]he 
patient has no change in his status and was given a work release. 
He has a job as a cook that is eminent [sic] and was given a release 
from the welfare department.11 (R. 160.) Mr. Ashcroft testified at 
the hearing that he did apply for the cook position, but following 
this work release he chose not to return to work and began attending 
school at Dixie College. (R. 41.) 
On July 12, 1990, Dr. Capel stated that the sitting required by 
Mr. Ashcroft's school activities was making him uncomfortable. He 
also had some aching muscles. (R. 161.) Later in the summer, Dr. 
Capel prescribed Xanax for Mr. Ashcroft's anxiety symptoms. (R. 
162.) 
Mr. Ashcroft began working for his father in his father's 
grocery store in Arizona in September, 1990. (R. 163.) This job 
lasted a few weeks. Dr. Capel's September 20, 1990 office note 
states, " . . . [h]e has found that the back did fairly well but his 
legs got tired as he was on his feet all day on concrete." (R. 
163.) Dr. Capel continued to prescribe Xanax and Naprosyn. (Id.) 
Dr. Capel's notes for a November 13, 1990 visit indicate that 
Mr. Ashcroft was having back and leg pain, and had discontinued some 
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of his conditioning activities. (R. 164.) Dr. Capel's November 
29, 1990 office notes describe a "new episode" of back pain 
occurring when Mr. Ashcroft lifted firewood and had a ". . . sudden 
onset of low back pain..." (R. 165.) On the basis of this new 
episode, Dr. Capel diagnosed facet syndrome and low back strain. 
(Id.) 
At his January 29, 1991 office visit, Mr. Ashcroft reported to 
Dr. Capel that he had worked in his father's grocery store again 
during Christmas and experienced leg aches. (R. 166.) He requested 
a prescription of Ascendin, but Dr. Capel declined to prescribe it 
due to side effects. 
At Mr. Ashcroft's visit with Dr. Capel on March 15, 1991, Dr. 
Capel reported another new episode of back pain: "The patient has 
been getting along reasonably well until March 14, 1991, when he 
bent down to clean up manure from his dog. He developed a sudden 
pain in the low back and had difficulty standing up straight." (R. 
167.) Dr. Capel concluded that the applicant had had a recurrence 
of iliolumbar strain sprain and, " . . . I further advised him that 
as far as the Industrial Commission is concerned, he is an 
administrative catch 22 situation where he cannot force them to 
assume care of his present complaint and while it is possibly 
associated in quality relation, it is a new episode." (R. 167.) 
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Following Dr. Capel's treatment, the applicant was examined by 
Dr. D. R. McNaught on May 8, 1991. (R. 174.) Dr. McNaught 
concluded that Mr. Ashcroft did have severe sciatica, due to the 
bulging of lumbar discs L4,5 and possibly LS. He recommended that 
the applicant investigate surgery, although Dr. McNaught expressed 
some reservations about that approach. (R. 189.) 
Mr. Ashcroft was not able to pursue surgical intervention on 
his back, due at least partially to the fact that he has Acquired 
Immune Deficiency Syndrome. The medical records indicate that Mr. 
Ashcroft tested positive for the HIV virus in the 1980s, and this 
condition has since developed into AIDS. Dr. Hagen has treated the 
applicant for AIDS since 1989. (R. 120.) He stated in a letter 
dated May 14, 1992, that the applicant's AIDS condition does not 
prevent him from conducting his normal activities; Dr. Hagan's 
records also indicate that he treated Mr. Ashcroft for a variety of 
conditions, and that Mr. Ashcroft was taking Prozac for depression. 
(R. 137.) 
Dr. McNaught referred the applicant to Dr. John Sanders for 
consideration of his back condition. (R. 190.) Dr. Sanders 
produced several reports, including one dated August 9, 1991 which 
concluded that surgical intervention was not warranted at that time, 
with no reference to the AIDS factors. (R. 190.) Dr. Sanders also 
wrote a one paragraph report dated October 7, 1991 stating: ". • 
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.It is my opinion that because he is unable to return to his usual 
work that he should have been given a disability rating of fifteen 
percent on that basis alone." (R. 193.) (See Addendum "F.") 
Dr. Boyd Holbrook performed a file review on the applicant's 
case on April 10, 1992, and found that the majority of his problems 
were not industrial in nature. (See Report attached as Addendum 
MG.ff) Dr. Holbrook stated in part, " . . . [t]his man does have 
significant multi-level cervical disc disease that is not related to 
his industrial injury and is not being considered for any possible 
surgical treatment and appears to be a relatively minor portion of 
his symptom complex." (Id.) Dr. Holbrook stated that no further 
medical treatment was needed in connection with Mr. Ashcroft's 1989 
injury, because ". . .it does not appear that more medical 
examinations or more diagnostic studies will assist in the 
delineation or management of his problem," and that Chymopapain 
injections are not advisable. (See Addendum "G.") 
Subsequently, on April 23, 1992, Dr. McNaught dictated an 
office progress note which indicates that "I would have suggested a 
10% disability . . . ." (R. 177.) This "disability rating" (which 
Mr. Ashcroft now relies upon as a medically sound impairment rating) 
cites no medical records nor the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of 
Permanent Impairment for support. (See Dr. McNaught's office note 
attached hereto as Addendum "H.") 
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which Rule 4 6 generally imposes as a prerequisite to the Utah 
Supreme Court's exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction do not exist 
in this case. 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S CERTIORARI PETITION DOES NOT 
SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 46(d) 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
In Point I of the Certiorari Brief, the applicant argues that 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 (1988) and Utah Industrial Commission Rule 
R568-1-9(A) required both the Industrial Commission and the Utah 
Court of Appeals to enter orders directing that a medical panel be 
convened to review the evidence submitted at the appellant's 
Industrial Commission hearing. Because the Industrial Commission 
refused to convene such a panel, and because the Utah Court of 
Appeals affirmed the Industrial Commission's Order, the appellant 
argues that the Utah Supreme Court must now exercise its certiorari 
jurisdiction so that it can instruct the lower courts in the proper 
use of medical panels. Unfortunately, the appellant has completely 
misread the Orders entered by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), 
the Industrial Commission, and the Utah Court of Appeals. The three 
rulings quite clearly indicate that § 35-1-77 and R568-1-9 have no 
relevance to the facts of this case because those provisions only 
come into play after the appellant has presented the Industrial 
Commission with competent medical evidence that can, as a threshold 
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Co,, 424 P.2d 440, 442 (Utah 1967). Consistent with Price River 
and Jensen, the Court of Appeals7 Ashcroft opinion merely defers to 
the Industrial Commission in its assessment as to whether the 
medical evidence in this case was sufficient to give rise to the 
need for medical panel assistance.2 There is no factual or legal 
basis, therefore, for the appellant's Certiorari Petition under Rule 
46(d). 
Appellant's sole argument during the Industrial Commission 
proceedings below was that a medical panel needed to be convened in 
this case due to an alleged 5% difference in permanent impairment 
ratings assigned to the appellant by different physicians.3 A brief 
review of the evidence analyzed by the Industrial Commission amply 
demonstrates that the appellant has never had a meritorious argument 
supporting his request for medical panel referral. Indeed, the 
administrative law judge properly observed that the so-called 
2It should be observed that the Ashcroft opinion is narrowly 
limited to the facts of the present case and will not generally 
extend to those cases where an injured worker or his attorney has 
provided the Industrial Commission with competent medical evidence. 
3Appellant's arguments that a panel had to be convened due to 
the Industrial Commission's use of "summary medical forms" and due 
to conflicting medical expense and medical stabilization evidence 
are arguments that were never raised at any stage of the Industrial 
Commission proceedings! Clearly, such hindsight arguments (which 
the appellant obviously wishes he could have made to the Court of 
Appeals) cannot now be considered for the first time in a Rule 46 
certiorari context. See, Pease v. Industrial Commission, 694 P. 2d 
613 (Utah 1984). 
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that "the patient c uid not return r-> r.: , w *.-rk and on that 
-\T-:-~ I h-'"^  ~,—~ • — .j j.^u,,/ •* - i ui 1^.- Again, like Dr. 
; l<tr\<lei * ::"_._, Joes not refer to any 
objective medical c, iter: i *. ich can serve ;. - : le 
suprT.ed rating. nuieover, UJ_ . ocuiutib- upjuiion ib ciedriy based 
up* .ne perception i-h*t- the applicant would be unable to return "to 
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his usual work" (and is therefore a disability rating); Dr. Sanders' 
opinion is not a physical impairment rating based upon the AMA 
Guidelines. 
Given the insufficiency of Dr. Sanders' and Dr. McNaught's 
"ratings", the administrative law judge/ the Industrial Commission, 
and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Mr. Ashcroft wholly 
failed to shoulder his burden of proof (imposed by a long line of 
Utah cases including Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 
(Utah 1986)); Mr. Ashcroft simply failed to submit to the Industrial 
Commission any records containing a well supported impairment 
rating. (See page 7 of Addendum "D.") Because of the deference the 
Court of Appeals affords to Industrial Commission findings of fact, 
and based on the "reasonableness" standard of review governing the 
Court's subject evidentiary issue (under Morton International v. 
Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991)), the Industrial 
Commission's final Order was properly affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals. 
Finally, given all of the new arguments the applicant has 
raised for the first time at the certiorari stage, the appellant is 
really asking the Supreme Court to grant him a de novo review of the 
Industrial Commission's final Order. However, as this Court 
recently stated in Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101, fn. 2 
(1992) : 
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We take tnis opportunity to remind the Bar that 
when exercis ing our certiorarI j urisdicti on 
granted by section 78-2-2 (3) (a), we review a 
decision of the Court of Appeals, not of the 
trial court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(a). Therefore, the briefs of the parties 
should address the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, not the decision of the trial court. 
To re-state the matter: We do not grant 
certiorari to review de novo the trial court's 
decision. See Utah R.App.P. 46. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Pursuant v tYr ~ rul ir.a sr.i thr- requirements cf S ^S-?-2 '?)(a) 
(1992 +"e appplla * -* present ra?^ ^ M -~* -rl iqa+~ : n*~ ro 
Appeals n:c:.. ince Butterfield and ^ --«:- ;; n -;/ude 
^h° T*tah Supreme Cc rt fro^ ^naaa i n^ ' • < *"- -r-;\-
 reviev- .^* *-
be denied. 
THE APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OP CERTIORARI 
LD BE DENIED BECAUSE IT DOES NOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS 
OF RULE 4 6(C) OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
rcntends T'-.i- . --.quested w n : shcu i i be granted pursuarv t. •* *Ie 
4 6 ^ ; u * — * st~' r^uieb ^ Appellate Procedure. He argues that the 
Court oi ,r.^ ..:,_ Ashcroft: opinion call s for "an exercise of the 
Supreme Court's power of supervision" because the opinion somehow 
i m p o s P, s m n p w . £ : d i f I i r i nit" •; t • < 1 1 1 r i, i ir n 1 i m | »i: i ] :ii I: :ii • :j a i 11 s wl: i o . i t1" e m p t 
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to preserve issues for appellate consideration. More specifically, 
the appellant contends that he properly preserved an insufficiency 
of the evidence issue below and that the Court of Appeals' opinion 
should be reversed due to the Court's conclusion that: 
. . • we deem that Ashcroft has waived the 
issues of sufficiency of the evidence and 
adequacy of the ALJ's findings and that he 
cannot now raise them for the first time on 
petition for judicial review. 
(See Addendum "A" at pp. 268-69.) The appellant's Rule 46(c) 
argument lacks merit and should be denied for three reasons. 
First, the appellant's argument should be seen for what it is. 
All that the appellant is asking the Supreme Court to do is re-
examine the Motion for Review he filed with the Industrial 
Commission on the grounds that the judges sitting on the Court of 
Appeals bench are apparently incompetent when it comes to evaluating 
lower court pleadings and determining whether certain legal issues 
have been raised in those pleadings. Appellant's argument must 
fail. The Court of Appeals is amply competent to examine an 
Industrial Commission Motion for Review and determine whether a 
legal argument (such as a sufficiency of the evidence argument) is 
contained in the pleading. The Court of Appeals conducted this 
examination, and then very clearly stated that the appellant's 
Motion for Review does not contain a sufficiency of the evidence 
challenge. Surely such an elementary and simple conclusion, based 
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* straiahtforward readir.n »: \ u r t r ; e a d * no ^ r r - r 
.1" 
undei r.«. ^ 4o* ; l i;.e i L 5:. x u i e s oi Appe , *dte W c o e a u r e . 
Acccrdina". - n p e l l m t ' s ^ q u e s t - e d wr r s hou ld ^ d e n i e d . 
I n d u s t r i a l LOir.;niSSi« n ( a t t a c h e d h e r e t o as .- icier. ' *7ay 
T a l l e n q e s t~hp ^'iff " ipnr< -^ *fc ^ Administrate i ^ ^ • - .- " - l d i e ' s 
t: , i ,1 1 Hi 
: J: Review aoes r^ ; 4hi,gnr oi's a::: : ;eces of medical evidence 
**;,K i'T the ^ppe 1 Ian**" ^ ^fered dur^no '*' * ^  T^H*. *~v*i -* i r'^ ir.^ ission 
IP vprv 
substantia t ;/ c; ^-laence suppor* :r.'i t ne ALJ's and the Industrial 
^omni3sior *indinge **f ^- m ^ • *1 * !) arpeiiant cannot 
*f fic iency of the 
evidence relied upo,f * *io ALJ t- ana I dust rial "ommissio: :-, 
Orders. 
^nae_ . rynt onrp d„i
 ti.s pni"ir° proceeding (both at "*"h^  
Tniusrria lissic-i level ar< *' ' he . r As >a , s ieve. : : 
*
 r„ ^ C P i i r ^ ~~-*«- * ; . -urden c * "arshdii *i I * n 
- - hp insu. , .ciency :.e Cv.aentiar> 
conclusions drawn D the ALJ arid rhf Industrial Commission. See, 
Stee^ .• . ..rausLr x ^ --ommissior 
-
 f;e the Court ^f Appeals ordereu Uiau Ui« ap^ei.anu ui ie; be 
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stricken partly on the basis of a failure to marshall the evidence); 
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah 
App. 1991) (holding that the marshalling process involved the 
arduous and painstaking listing of all evidence adverse to the 
position of the party challenging the lower court's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law). Without undertaking the marshalling 
process, the appellant never began to challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence underpinning the Administrative Law Judge's final 
Order. Again, a Writ of Certiorari should not be granted under Rule 
46(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Third, the appellant mistakenly refers to Rule 49(a)(4) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure in arguing that this Court should 
grant his requested Writ. Rule 49(a)(4) — which provides that a 
statement of a certiorari issue will be deemed to comprise every 
subsidiary question fairly included therein" — applies only in a 
context of a certiorari proceeding. The Rule cannot be used to 
somehow suggest that the appellants' Motion for Review filed with 
the Industrial Commission must be read in such an overly broad 
fashion that it can be deemed to contain a sufficiency of the 
evidence challenge. In short, the appellant simply has no factual 
or legal basis for arguing that he legitimately raised a sufficiency 
of the evidence challenge. The Court of Appeals properly concluded, 
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therefore, that the appellant waived the is-ue - .- . ndustrial 
Comm i ssi • ::; i i I = = .] 
For the foregoing reasorc a™^11ees respect.i~ * ly submit ;,;..it 
the appe l lant ' s Pet. t: ion fcr i *•- .* r l e r t i o r a r to^id r;e denied, 
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much as we vacate the trial court's deter- claimant sought review, 
mination and remand for further findings 
as to the equitable distribution of the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the hardware store, 
the propriety of awarding accounting costs 
to Mrs. Rappleye, and the reasonableness 
of the award of attorney fees to Mrs. Rapp-
leye at trial, Mrs. Rappleye has substantial-
ly prevailed on those issues. Potter v. 
Potter, 845 P.2d 272, 275, (Utah App.1993). 
Accordingly, we remand the issue of attor-
ney fees incurred by Mrs. Rappleye on 
appeal to the trial court for its consider-
ation of such fees in light of the disposition 
of this case on appeal. Id. 
Utah 267 
The Court of Ap-
peals, Garff, J., held that: (1) certain issues 
were not properly preserved; (2) there was 
no error in failing to convene a medical 
panel; but (3) Commission applied incorrect 
standard of review. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the trial court's award of ali-
mony to Mrs. Rappleye. We vacate (1) the 
court's valuation of the Merrill Lynch ac-
count, (2) the award of all of the proceeds 
from the sale of the hardware store to Mr. 
Rappleye, (3) the denial of accounting costs 
to Mrs. Rappleye, and (4) the award of 
attorney fees to Mrs. Rappleye, and re-
mand those matters to the trial court for 
further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. We also determine that Mrs. 
Rappleye is entitled to attorney fees on 
appeal and remand the matter to the trial 
court for its consideration of such fees in 
light of the disposition of this case on ap-
peal. 
BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
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Workers' compensation benefits were 
denied by the Industrial Commission, and 
1. Workers' Compensation <s=>1855, 1856 
Workers' compensation claimant did 
not properly preserve for review issues of 
sufficiency of evidence and adequacy of 
findings of administrative law judge where 
he failed to raise those issues before the 
Industrial Commission, but claim that Com-
mission employed the wrong standard of 
proof was properly before Court of Ap-
peals even though raised for first time on 
judicial review, since it could not have been 
raised until after the Commission made its 
review. 
2. Workers' Compensation <s=1820 
Preponderance of the evidence rather 
than substantial evidence was the correct 
standard of proof for review by Industrial 
Commission in determining workers' com-
pensation claim. 
3. Workers' Compensation <s=»1687 
Statutory language concerning conven-
ing of medical panel in workers' compensa-
tion case is permissive rather than manda-
tory." U.C.A.1953, 35-l-77(lXa). 
4. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s»413 
Agency's interpretation or application 
of its own rule will not be disturbed unless 
determination exceeds the bounds of rea-
sonableness and rationality. 
5. Workers' Compensation «=>1687 
Industrial Commission rule requiring 
utilization of medical review panel in cer-
tain workers' compensation cases did not 
apply where Commission found no specific 
or supported impairment rating in the rec-
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ord, much less conflicting impairment rat-
ings, and did not find that ratings given 
related to industrial cause. U.C.A.1953, 
35-l-77(lXa), 6&-46b-16(4)(hXii). 
Bruce J. Wilson and Sam Primavera, Pro-
vo, for petitioner. 
Michael E. Dyer and Michael A. Peter-
son, Salt Lake City, for Airfax Exp., Inc., 
and Liberty Mut Ins. Co. 
Benjamin A. Sims, Salt Lake City, for 
Indus. Com'n. 
Before GARFF, GREENWOOD and 
ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: -
-Petitioner, Denis Ashcroft, seeks review 
by this court of an Industrial Commission 
order denying him workers compensation 
benefits. We affirm in part, reverse in 
part, and remand. 
FACTS ' -
'On September 25, 1989, Ashcroft sus-
tained an industrial injury while unloading 
freight from a truck. The employer's com-
pensation insurer paid temporary total dis-
ability benefits from September 26, 1989 
through June 5, 1990 as well as compensa-
tion for a five percent permanent partial 
impairment 
On September 26, 1991, Ashcroft peti-
tioned for additional temporary disability 
compensation, an increased permanent par-
tial disability rating and medical expenses. 
Ashcroft alleged that the same September 
25, 1989 industrial injury rendered him un-
able to work. -
After a formal hearing, the administra-
tive law judge (ALJ) denied Ashcroff s 
claim. The ALJ did not convene a medical 
panel, despite a request by both parties' 
counsel to do so. The ALJ discounted con-
elusory statements of two expert witnesses 
regarding Ashcroft's impairment ratings: 
Dr. Capel merely recites what the insur-
ance adjustor was offering and post-
pones a rating; Dr. Sanders makes a 
conclusory statement of 15% without ref-
erence to any underlying facts or indus-
trial cause. 
The ALJ made findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, which the Commission es-
sentially adopted. She determined that 
"the true cause of [Ashcroft's] continuing 
problems stem from pre-existing degenera-
tive problems, intervening non-industrial 
events, and unrelated health conditions. 
Therefore, his claim fails for lack of medi-
cal and legal causation/' 
Ashcroft moved the Industrial Commis-
sion for review. In his motion, Ashcroft 
failed to raise issues regarding sufficiency 
of the evidence and adequacy of the ALJ's 
findings, concentrating his administrative 
appeal on the ALJ's refusal to convene a 
medical panel The Commission, after 
adopting the AU's findings, affirmed the 
ALJ's denial of benefits. Ashcroft now 
seeks review of the Commission's denial. 
' PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
[1] We first consider the threshold is-
sue of whether Ashcroft properly pre-
served for review the issues he now raises, 
namely issues of sufficiency of the evi-
dence, standard of proof and adequacy of 
the AU's findings, given that he failed to 
raise these issues before the Commission. 
Pease v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d 
613 (Utah 1984) is dispositive. The Pease 
court held that a petitioner, in moving for 
review, has "the obligation to raise all the 
issues that could have been presented at 
that time, and those issues not raised [are] 
waived." Id. at 616; accord Smallwood v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 841 P.2d 716, 718 n. 1 
(Utah App.1992). The rationale is that by 
raising an issue at the administrative level, 
"either the administrative law judge or the 
Commission could have adjudicated the is-
sue." Pease, 694 P.2d at 616. 
Ashcroft failed to raise the above issues 
before the Commission. Of those issues, 
all except for his claim that the Commis-
sion employed the wrong standard of 
proof, are claims that could have been pre-
sented to the Commission. See id. Thus, 
we deem that Ashcroft has waived the is-
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sues of sufficiency of the evidence and 
adequacy of the ALJ's findings and that he 
cannot now raise them for the first time on 
petition for judicial review. Id. Ashcroft 
could not have raised the claim that the 
Commission employed the wrong standard 
of proof until after the Commission had 
made its review. Thus, this claim is prop-
erly before this court even though it is 
raised for the first time on judicial review. 
STANDARD OF PROOF 
[2] Ashcroft claims the Commission ap-
plied the wrong standard of proof when it 
denied his motion for review. In its review 
of the ALJ's decision, the Commission em-
ployed the phrase "substantial evidence." 
This is not the correct standard. The quan-
tum of evidence required to prove compens-
ability is a preponderance of the evidence. 
Lipman v. Industrial Comm'n, 592 P.2d 
616, 618 (Utah 1979). 
The distinction between preponderance 
of evidence and substantial evidence is sig-
nificant A reviewing body, such as this 
court, applies the standard of substantial 
evidence to examine whether the record 
contains evidence supporting the findings 
made by the trier of fact The reviewing 
court does not weigh the evidence, in con-
trast a trier of fact including the Commis-
sion, determines whether the petitioner has 
met his or her burden of proof, the stan-
dard being preponderance of the evidence. 
The Commission's mistake as to the stan-
dard of proof is not one of mere phraseolo-
gy. Both Ashcroft and this court are enti-
tled to know that his proof was evaluated 
under the correct standard. 
We therefore remand the claim for the 
Commission to evaluate it under the stan-
dard of preponderance of the evidence. 
MEDICAL PANEL 
Ashcroft claims the Commission acted 
unreasonably and irrationally in not con-
vening a medical panel. Ashcroft pre-
served this issue by including it in his mo-
tion for review before the Commission. 
See Pease v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d 
613, 616 (Utah 1984). 
[3] The "Commission may refer the 
medical aspects of [a workers compensa-
tion] case to a medical panel appomted by 
the Commission." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-
77(lXa) (1992) (emphasis added). This stat-
utory language is permissive, not mandato-
ry. See Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 839 P.2d 841, 845 
(Utah App.1992). 
Pursuant to section 35-l-77(lXa), the 
Commission enacted Rule 568-1-9 as a 
guideline in determining if a medical panel 
should be convened. In contrast to the 
statute, the wording of the agency rule is 
mandatory: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical is-
sues may be involved. Generally a sig-
nificant medical issue must be shown by 
conflicting medical reports/ Significant 
medical issues are involved when there 
are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of per-
manent physical impairment which vary 
more than 5% of the whole person, 
Utah Code Admin.P. R568-1-9 (emphasis 
added). Thus, the rule requires the Com-
mission to convene a medical panel when 
the evidence supports conflicting industrial 
impairment ratings with more than a five 
percent difference. If the evidence regard-
ing impairment ratings supports ratings 
that vary by more than five percent as 
petitioner asserts, a medical panel would be 
necessary to resolve the differences. 
In short the statute explicitly grants dis-
cretion to the Commission as to whether to 
convene a medical panel. The Commission, 
in turn, restricted its own discretion by 
promulgating the Rule requiring it to con-
vene a medical panel in certain instances. 
[4,51 Our review is pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) (1987) be-
cause this issue requires us to consider 
whether the agency acted contrary to its 
own rule. Thus, "we will not disturb the 
agency's interpretation or application of 
the [rule] unless its determination exceeds 
the bounds of reasonableness and rationali-
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ty." King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 
P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah App.1993).1 . 
Here, the Commission determined: 
The bald statement by Dr. Sanders, in 
connection with his assertion that a 15 
percent rating was appropriate, was sup-
ported by absolutely no medical analysis 
or logic. We need some justification, and 
in the absence of such, we cannot specu-
late. In the case of Dr. Capel, there is 
no statement by him as to any appropri-
ate rating, other than a statement that 
the adjuster had decided upon a five per-
cent rating. We therefore conclude that 
the evidence does not support the appli-
cant in this regard. 
In short, the Commission found no specific 
or supported impairment rating in the rec-
ord, much less conflicting impairment rat-
ings. Nor did the Commission find that the 
ratings given related to an industrial cause. 
Thus, there was no departure from the 
agency rule because the agency rule did 
not apply. Therefore, we need not consider 
whether any departure was reasonable and 
rational. 
CONCLUSION 
Ashcroft could have, but failed to raise 
the issues of sufficiency of the evidence 
and adequacy of the AU's findings. We 
therefore deem that he has waived those 
issues. We affirm the AU's refusal to 
convene a medical panel as reasonable and 
rational because the A U found no specific 
or supported impairment rating in the rec-
ord. On the other hand, we cannot affirm 
the Commission's decision because the 
Commission employed the wrong standard 
of proof in its review of the evidence. We 
therefore reverse the Commission's order 
and remand for the Commission to conduct 
a review employing the proper standard of 
preponderance of the evidence. 
1. In the event we determine an agency has in 
fact departed from its own rule, we would then 
consider whether the departure was reasonable 
and rational. King, 850 P.2d at 1284-88; Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4XhXii); SEMECO In-
dus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 
1167, 1174 (Utah 1993) (Durham J., dissenting) 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. -.. 
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ., concur. 
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Action was brought for establishment 
of prescriptive easement The First Dis-
trict Court, Box Elder County, Robert L. 
Newey, J., entered orders establishing 
prescriptive easement, clarifying size and 
burden of easement, and holding owner of 
dominant estate in contempt Appeal and 
cross appeal were' taken. The Court of 
Appeals, Jackson, J., held that (1) relief 
from original judgment was properly 
granted based upon determination that 
judgment was not factually consistent with 
legal ruling regarding historical width of 
easement; (2) requirement that gates pro-
viding access to easement be kept closed 
was inconsistent with historic use of ease-
ment and thus was improper; and (3) own-
er of dominant estate was properly held in 
contempt for dumping onions along ease-
("courts also should uphold reasonable and ra-
tional departures from agency rules absent a 
showing by the party challenging the departure 
that the departure violated some other right") 
(citing Union Pac. HH v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 
876, 879 (Utah 1992)). 
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78-2-1.5 JUDICIAL CODE 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-2-1; L. 1969, ch. 247, § 1; 1986, ch. 
47, § 40; 1988, ch. 248, § 4; 1990, ch. 80, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection 
(2), rewrote the second sentence which read 
'Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the 
Supreme Court is ten years and until his suc-
cessor is appointed and approved in accordance 
with Section 20-1-7.1" and, in Subsection (6), 
substituted "determines" for "decides" at the 
end of the fourth sentence. 
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 
1990, deleted "next" after "January" and made 
punctuation changes in Subsection (2); deleted 
"not" following "chief justice may" in the third 
sentence of Subsection (3); deleted "additional" 
before "duties" in Subsection (5); deleted 
"where not inconsistent with the law" follow-
ing "chief justice" and added "as consistent 
with the law" at the end of Subsection (6). 
Cross-References. — Chief justice, Utah 
Const, Art. VIII, Sec. 2. 
Disqualification in particular case, Utah 
Const., Art. Vm, Sec. 2. 
Judicial nomination and selection, 
§ 20-1-7.1 et seq. 
Membership on state law library board, 
§ 37-1-1. 
Proceedings unaffected by vacancy, 
§ 78-7-21. 
Qualifications of justices, Utah Const., Art. 
VIII, Sec. 7. 
Retirement, Utah Const., Art. Vm, Sec. 15; 
§ 49-6-101 et seq., §§ 78-7-29, 78-7-30. 
Salary, Utah Const., Art. Vm, Sec. 14. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts 
§§ 67, 68. 
C.J.S. — 21 C J.S. Courts § 111 et seq.; 48A 
C.J.S. Judges §§ 3, 7, 8, 21 to 25, 85. 
Key Numbers. — Courts «=» 101, 248; 
Judges *=» 1, 7 to 12. 
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 78-2-1.5 (L. 1969, ch. 
225, § 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court 
justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 182, 
§ 4. 
Section 78-2-1.6 (L. 1979, ch. 134, § 1; 1981, 
ch. 156, § 1), relating to salaries of justices, 
was repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 267, § 2, effec-
tive July 1, 1982. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
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(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988, 
ch. 248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, § 1. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch. 47, § 41 repeals former § 78-2-2, as enacted 
by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 1, relating to original 
appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, and 
enacts the above section. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25,1988, substituted "for-
mal adjudicative proceedings" for "cases" in 
Subsection (3)(e); added Subsection (3)(f); re-
designated former Subsections (3)(f) to (3)(i) ac-
cordingly; substituted "(i)" for "(h)" at the end 
of Subsection (4Xg); and made minor stylistic 
changes. 
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 
1989, added "and Forestry" at the end of Sub-
section (3)(e)(iii); rewrote Subsection (4)(a) 
which read "first degree and capital felony con-
victions"; substituted "(f)" for "(i)" at the end of 
Subsection (4)(g); and made minor stylistic 
changes. 
Cross-References. — Appeals from juve-
nile courts, § 78-3a-51. 
Appeals in criminal cases, U.R.Cr.P. 26. 
Chief justice to preside over impeachment of 
governor, § 77-5-2. 
Election contest appeals, §§ 20-3-35, 
20-15-14. 
Extraordinary writs, Utah Const. Art. Vm, 
Sec. 3; U.R.C.P. 65B. 
Industrial commission orders, review of, 
§ 35-1-36. 
Jurisdiction, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 3. 
State bar, promulgation of rules, review of 
disciplinary orders, §§ 78-51-14, 78-51-19. 
Unemployment compensation decisions, re-
view of, § 35-4-10. 
Rule 45 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 422 
TITLE VII. 
JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO COURT OF APPEALS. 
Rule 45- Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of 
Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a 
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
Rule 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The follow-
ing, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's 
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the 
Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by the Supreme Court. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- subdivision designations from numbers to let-
ment, effective October 1, 1992, changed the ters. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 
(Utah 1992). 
Rule 47. Certification and transmission of record; joint 
and separate petitions; cross-petitions; parties. 
(a) Joint and separate petitions; cross-petitions. Parties interested 
jointly, severally, or otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of 
certiorari; any one or more of them may petition separately; or any two or 
more of them may join in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be 
reviewed on certiorari and involve identical or closely related questions, it 
will suffice to file a single petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the 
cases. A cross-petition for writ of certiorari shall not be joined with any other 
filing. 
(b) Parties. All parties to the proceeding in the Court of Appeals shall be 
deemed parties in the Supreme Court, unless the petitioner notifies the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court in writing of the petitioner's belief that one or more of 
the parties below have no interest in the outcome of the petition. A copy of 
such notice shall be served on all parties to the proceeding below, and a party 
noted as no longer interested may remain a party by notifying the clerk, with 
service on the other parties, that the party has an interest in the petition. 
(c) Motion for certification and transmission of record. A party intend-
ing to file a petition for certiorari, prior to filing the petition or at any time 
prior to action by the Supreme Court on the petition, may file a motion for an 
order to have the Clerk of the Court of Appeals or the clerk of the trial court 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP UTAH 
Case No. 91000984 
DENIS ASHCROFT, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
AIRFAX EXPRESS, 
and/or LIBERTY 
MUTUAL INSURANCE, 
Defendants. 
* 
* 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES! 
Commission Conference Room, Washington County 
Commission offices, 197 East Tabernacle, St. 
George, Utah on May 19, 1992, at 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
Said hearing pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
The Honorable Lisa-Michele Church, Administrative 
Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and represented by Bruce 
Wilson, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by Michael Dyer, 
Attorney at Law. 
This is a claim for additional temporary total disability 
compensation and medical expenses in connection with a 9/25/89 
industrial injury. The defendant insurance carrier denies 
liability on the basis of medical and legal causation. 
An evidentiary hearing was held, during which oral and written 
evidence was presented. At the conclusion of the evidentiary 
hearing, the matter was taken under advisement by the 
Administrative Law Judge. Having been fully advised in the 
premises, the Administrative Law Judge now enters the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant in this matter, Denis Ashcroft, was employed as 
a driver for Airfax Express in 1989, earning 18 cents per mile. He 
was unmarried with no dependent children at the time of his injury. 
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On September 25, 1989, the applicant was unloading boxes with a 
dolly to persons on the ground at a Salt Lake K-Mart location, and 
he bent over and could not straighten up. He felt pain in his 
back, crawled to the edge of the truck bed and called his employer. 
His employer told him to finish unloading, but Ashcroft had the 
store employees do it for him. He then drove to another K-Mart and 
did the same. Ashcroft drove to Ogden, parked the truck, and took 
a taxi to the McKay Dee Hospital Emergency Room. 
At the emergency room, they took x-rays, gave him muscle 
relaxants and pain medication. No medical records were available 
from this visit. Thereafter the applicant rode the bus back to St. 
George. There, he consulted Dr. McGregor, his family doctor, on 
September 28, 1989 (Ex. D-01, p. 5). Dr. McGregor advised complete 
bed rest and continued to see him for two months. Dr. McGregor's 
records indicate a diagnosis of bulging disc/spinal stenosis and 
refer the applicant to Dr. Bliss, a neurosurgeon. 
Dr. Bliss saw the applicant on October 20, 1989, and 
diagnosed, ". . . central disc herniation with minor spinal 
stenosis at this level.11 He recommended conservative treatment. 
(Ex. D-l, p. 19.) 
In December, 1989, Dr. Bliss noted Ashcroft's continuing 
bilateral leg pain and reviewed his myelogram and CT scan. He 
stated his impression was "• . • sciatica-like symptoms with 
central disc herniation and no definite evidence of neural 
impingement." The applicant was then referred to Dr. Moress for a 
neurological consult. 
Dr. Moress saw Ashcroft on February 1, 1990 and recommended a 
complete myelography. Dr. Bliss reviewed this recommendation and 
noted w. . . [Dr. Moress] suspects possible demyelinating disorder 
if symptoms are not explained by stenosis. MRI scan of c. spine 
demonstrates multilevel disc disease. Previous lumbar myelogram 
and CT scan demonstrated multiple level bulging discs without 
definite stenosis.H Later in the same report, Dr. Bliss stated, H. 
. . Patient clearly interprets all of his problems as stemming from 
his recent accident although multiple level disc disease indicates 
that he has had pre-existing problems and in addition, back pain is 
not his major complaint at this time.11 (Ex. D-l, p. 24.) 
On February 2, 1990, in response to an inquiry from State 
Vocational Rehabilitation, Dr. Bliss described Ashcroft's status as 
M
. . . medically stable for return to limited employment in non-
laboring activity." (Ex. D-l, p. 26.) The applicant testified 
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that he applied for and was denied unemployment benefits in late 
1989, due to a prior lien. 
On April 12, 1990, the applicant consulted another orthopedic 
physician, Dr. Neal Capel. Dr. Capel saw him on 4/12/90 and 
recommended a program of conditioning for Ashcroft. In the notes 
of that visit, Dr. Capel also mentioned, ". . . Liberty Mutual 
account manager determined his permanent partial disability as 5%, 
March 26, 1990, is the cutoff of benefits...The patient will have 
his disability rating deferred until the conclusion of his work 
hardening and conditioning in 6 weeks." (Ex. D-l, p. 32.) 
At the May 10, 1990, visit with the applicant, Dr. Capel 
described a visit Ashcroft had made to the emergency room for 
intrascapular pain and noted, " . . . The most likely explanation is 
an anxiety reaction with somatization." Dr. Capel continued to 
recommend swimming, bicycle riding and general conditioning. 
At the June 5, 1990, visit, Dr. Capel's office notes state, ". 
. . The patient has no change in his status and was given a work 
release. He has a job as a cook that is eminent [sic] and was 
given a release from the welfare department." (Ex. D-l, p. 34.) 
Ashcroft testified he did apply for the cook position. Following 
this work release however, the applicant did not return to work, 
but began attending school at Dixie College. 
At the July 12, 1990, office visit, Dr. Capel stated that 
sitting required by the applicants school activities was making 
him uncomfortable. He also had some aching muscles. Later in the 
summer, Dr. Capel prescribed Xanax for Ashcroft's anxiety symptoms. 
Ashcroft began working for his father in his grocery store in 
Arizona in September, 1990. This job lasted a few weeks. Dr. 
Capel/s notes state, ". . .He has found that the back did fairly 
well but his legs got tired as he was on his feet all day on 
concrete." Dr. Capel continued to prescribe Xanax and Naprosyn. 
(Ex. D-l, p. 37.) 
Dr. Capel's notes for November 13, 1990, visit indicate that 
Ashcroft was having back and leg pain, and had discontinued some of 
his conditioning activities. His November 29, 1990, office notes 
describe a "new episode" of back pain occurring when Ashcroft 
lifted firewood and had, ". . . sudden onset of low back pain..." 
(Ex. D-l, p. 39.) Dr. Capel diagnosed facet syndrome and low back 
strain. The applicant testified that this episode involved him 
lifting two or three pieces of wood branches that would fit in his 
fireplace. 
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At his January 29, 1991, office visit, the applicant reported 
to Dr. Capel that he had worked in his father's grocery store again 
during Christinas and experienced leg aches. He requested a 
prescription of Ascendin, but Dr. Capel declined to prescribe it 
due to side effects. 
At Ashcroft's visit with Dr. Capel on March 15, 1991, Dr. 
Capel reported another episode of back pain: MThe patient has been 
getting along reasonably well until March 14, 1991, when he bent 
down to clean up manure from his dog. He developed a sudden pain 
in the low back and had difficulty standing up straight.11 Dr. 
Capel concluded that the applicant had had a recurrence of 
iliolumbar strain sprain and, ". . .1 further advised him that as 
far as the Industrial Commission is concerned, He is an 
administrative catch 22 situation where he cannot force them to 
assume care of his present complaint and while it is possibly 
associated in quality relation, it is a new episode." (Ex. D-l, p. 
41.) Ashcroft testified that he was using a 3/4 length shovel and 
bent over and felt back pain. He then had difficulty straightening 
up. 
Following Dr. Capel's treatment, the applicant was examined by 
Dr. D.R. McNaught on May 8, 1991. Dr. McNaught concluded that 
Ashcroft did have severe sciatica, due to the bulging of lumbar 
discs L4,5 and possibly LS. He recommended that the applicant 
investigate surgery, although Dr. McNaught expressed some 
reservations about that approach. 
In fact, the applicant was not able to pursue surgical 
intervention on his back, due at least partially to the fact that 
he has Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. (Ex. D-l, p. 61-62.) 
The medical records indicate that Ashcroft tested positive for the 
HIV virus in the 1980s, and this condition has since developed into 
AIDS. (Ex. D-l, p. 10-17.) Dr. Hagen has treated the applicant 
for AIDS since 1989. He stated in a letter dated May 14, 1992, 
that the applicant's AIDS condition does not prevent him from 
conducting his normal activities, (Ex. A-l). Hagan's records also 
indicate that he treated Ashcroft for a variety of conditions, and 
that Ashcroft was taking Prozac for depression. 
Dr. McNaught referred the applicant to Dr. John Sanders for 
consideration of his back condition. Dr. Sanders produced several 
reports, including one dated August 9, 1991, which concluded that 
surgical intervention was not warranted at that time, with no 
reference to the AIDS factors. Dr. Sanders also wrote a one 
paragraph report dated October 7, 1991 stating: ". . .It is my 
opinion that because he is unable to return to his usual work that 
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he should have been given a disability rating of fifteen percent on 
that basis alone,H (Ex. D-l, p. 66.) 
Dr. Boyd Holbrook performed a file review on the applicant's 
case on April 10, 1992, and found that the majority of his problems 
were not industrial in nature. Dr. Holbrook stated in part, H. . 
. This man does have significant multi-level cervical disc disease 
that is not related to his industrial injury and is not being 
considered for any possible surgical treatment and appears to be a 
relatively minor portion of his symptom complex.11 Dr. Holbrook 
opined that no further medical treatment was needed in connection 
with Ashcroft's 1989 injury, that, w. . .it does not appear that 
more medical examinations or more diagnostic studies will assist in 
the delineation or management of his problem," and that Chymopapain 
injections are not advisable, (Ex. D-l, p. 67). 
Ashcroft also sought chiropractic care from Dr. Wageman in St. 
George. Those chiropractic records show the applicant received 
treatments from September 27, 1991, through December, 1991 for 35 
visits. Dr. Wageman believed that Ashcroft suffered, ". . .an 
exacerbation of his post-traumatic injuries sustained in the 
original accident,H of 1989 (Ex. A-l). 
The applicant's medical records indicate that he has undergone 
the following diagnostic procedures since his industrial injury: x-
rays (10/89), CT scan (10/89), myelogram-CT scan (12/89), MRI 
(2/90), CT scan (5/91), x-rays (10/91), MRI (10/91). 
The applicant currently experiences aches in his back and 
legs. He takes AZT, wellbutrin and dalmane, as well as headache 
medicines. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant in this matter, Denis Ashcroft, unfortunately 
has failed to sustain his burden of proof that further temporary 
total disability benefits or medical expense benefits are causally 
related to his industrial accident of 1989. In fact, according to 
medical specialists, the true cause of the applicant's continuing 
problems stem from pre-existing degenerative problems, intervening 
non-industrial events, and unrelated health conditions. Therefore, 
his claim fails for lack of medical and legal causation. 
At the time of the hearing, there was no evidence that 
Ashcroft was unable to work during the period of his additional 
temporary total disability claim. The applicant testified that he 
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applied for unemployment, applied for a job as a cook, and in fact, 
attended school full-time. He also worked in his father's grocery 
store for a time. Two doctors had released him to work (Dr. Bliss, 
2/2/90) (Dr. Capel, 6/5/90) and considered him medically stable. 
No other medical provider has taken him off work. Utah workers 
compensation law is specific on this issue, lf. . . Once a claimant 
reaches medical stabilization, the claimant is moved from temporary 
to permanent status and he is no longer eligible for temporary 
benefits.11 Booms v. Rapp Construction, 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 
1986.) Lack of stabilization is the plaintiff's burden to prove, 
Griffith v. Industrial Commission. 754 P.2d 981 (Ct. of App. Utah 
1988) . 
Applicant's counsel argues that Ashcroft is entitled to 
further benefits while he is still in the "diagnostic" stage of his 
treatment for his back injury. Unfortunately, the medical records 
clearly indicate that this case has long ago exhausted the 
diagnostic stage. In fact, the applicant has been seen by at least 
six specialists, and has had every possible diagnostic test 
performed at least twice for his back pain symptoms. The case is 
also tragically complicated by the presence of the applicant's AIDS 
condition, which may not have become a ". . .severe medical 
problem," but ultimately is life-threatening and therefore bound to 
influence the applicant's choices with regard to surgery, 
employment, as well as any optional medical treatment. 
Further, the medical records in this file indicate that the 
applicant's case involves psychological components. Moreover, when 
carefully reviewed, it is illogical for one to attempt to pin all 
the troublesome circumstances of a situation on a single incident 
of lumbar strain several years ago, particularly when that 
condition stabilized within months and was one which the doctors 
refused to surgically treat. 
Applicant's counsel further argues that the applicant may fall 
into the rare category of one who suffers a sacroiliac condition 
that is difficult to diagnose. There is no indication, however, of 
that suspicion on behalf of Ashcroft's numerous physicians. Such 
arguments are speculative and general, and cannot be the basis of 
extending workers compensation benefits indefinitely to the 
applicant. 
The Administrative Law Judge agrees with Ashcroft's physicians 
who have identified this case as a complex one, involving pre-
existing and psychological factors. In addition, the applicant 
experienced two subsequent non-industrial events which occurred 
when his doctor said he was doing well. The improvement he was 
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making, together with the strenuous nature of the incidents 
themselves, render those subsequent events intervening and causally 
contributing to his continuing back problems. 
As to the permanent partial impairment rating, the applicant 
was paid compensation on a 5% whole person permanent partial 
disability rating by the defendants. The Administrative Law Judge 
does not find a specific rating in the records: Dr. Capel merely 
recites what the insurance adjustor was offering and postpones a 
rating; Dr. Sanders makes a conclusory statement of 15% without 
reference to any underlying facts or industrial cause. Without a 
well-supported rating in the record, and the Administrative Law 
Judge can only note that a 5% impairment is reasonable for an 
unoperated disc problem according to the AMA Guides To the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Table 53. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim of the applicant, Denis 
Ashcroft, for additional temporary total disability and medical 
expenses compensation in connection with his industrial injury of 
September 25, 1989, should be and is hereby denied for lack of 
legal and medical causation. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600 
Denis Ashcroft, * 
• 
Applicant, * 
vs. * 
Airfax Express, and/or * 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., * 
* 
Respondents. * 
•••••a*************************** 
The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for 
Review of applicant in the above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12. 
The applicant's claim asks for additional compensation and 
payments in connection with medical expenses, temporary total 
compensation (TTC), permanent partial compensation (PPC), travel 
expenses, interest, and medical treatment as a result of his back 
injury on September 25, 1989. The administrative law judge (ALJ) 
concluded that the applicant had failed to show legal and medical 
causation, and therefore denied his claim. It is from this denial 
that the applicant appeals based on allegations of the following 
errors: 
1. Rejection by the ALJ of two permanent partial 
disability ratings in favor of a two year old rating done by the 
"Liberty Mutual account manager." 
2. The failure of the ALJ to order that a medical panel 
be convened to consider among other items the question of maximum 
medical improvement. 
3. The ALJ did not consider that the treating doctors 
were in the diagnostic stages of the case, and the doctors had not 
decided upon a course of treatment. 
4. The ALJ lost or ignored the chiropractor's results 
that the applicant was improving with chiropractic treatment. 
5. This case contains objective evidence of several 
radiographically verified disc injuries, and surgery was a "clear 
possibility but for the complication of the AIDS." 
The respondents argue in rebuttal that the medical evidence 
did not give rise to the need for a medical panel review, and that 
there is no conflict in the medical evidence regarding the 
applicant's attainment of maximum medical improvement. We will 
DENIAL OF MOTION 
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briefly discuss the pertinent facts as they relate to the 
allegations of error. 
There seems to be no dispute about the basic facts of the 
original industrial injury, in 1989. At that time, the applicant 
was a driver for Airfax Express. On September 25, 1989, he was 
using a dolly to unload boxes at a K-Mart. He bent over, and could 
not thereafter stand straight. Experiencing pain in his back, he 
crawled to the edge of his truck, and called his employer. His 
employer told him to finish unloading.1 He apparently was able to 
have the K-Mart employees complete the task, and he subsequently 
drove to another K-Mart where he was again able to have its 
employees do the same. The applicant then drove to Ogden, parked 
his truck, and used a taxi to get to a hospital emergency room. 
The emergency room treatment and procedures consisted of x-
rays, muscle relaxants, and pain medication. After a trip back to 
St. George by bus, the applicant was treated by his family doctor, 
Dr. McGregor, on September 28, 1989. After a period of bed rest, 
the applicant was seen by the doctor during the following two 
months. Dr. McGregor diagnosed the applicant as having bulging 
disc/spinal stenosis. The doctor referred the applicant to Dr. 
Bliss, a neurosurgeon. 
Dr. Bliss saw the applicant on a number of occasions during 
the period October 20, 1989 through February 20, 1990. The doctor 
recommended that the applicant receive conservative treatment, and 
stated that "...Patient clearly interprets all of his problems as 
stemming from his recent accident although multiple level disc 
disease indicates that he has had pre-existing problems and in 
addition, back pain is not his major complaint at this time." 
Exhibit D-l, at 24. Further, the doctor concluded on February 2, 
1990 that the applicant was w...medically stable for return to 
limited employment in nonlaboring activity.11 I£., at 26. 
During the period April 12, 1990 through March 15, 1991, the 
applicant was treated by Dr. Capel. Dr. Capel placed the applicant 
on a work hardening and conditioning program. On May 10, 1990, the 
applicant experienced intrascapular pain, and went to an emergency 
room for treatment. The doctor explained this episode as an 
anxiety reaction with somatization, and recommended general 
conditioning, bicycle riding, and swimming. On June 5, 1990, the 
applicant was given a work release, and apparently told the doctor 
that he had an imminent job as a cook. Apparently, the applicant 
did not return to work, but instead attended Dixie College as a 
student. 
Between July 12, 1990, and March 15, 1991, the applicant 
063 
ASHCROFT 
ORDER 
PAGE THREE 
experienced muscle aches, back and leg pain, and anxiety symptoms 
on various occasions. Low back pain appeared after the applicant 
lifted two or three pieces of firewood, and a second episode 
occurred when the applicant attempted to clean up some of his dog's 
excrement. Dr. Capel noted on November 13, 1990 that the applicant 
had discontinued some of his conditioning exercises. 
It appears that surgery is either not warranted for the 
applicant's medical problems, or is not recommended due to AIDS 
which has developed in the applicant from his initial contact with 
the HIV in the 1980's. Although one doctor recommended that the 
applicant investigate surgery (Dr. McNaught), another (Dr. Hunter) 
indicated that some surgery may be possible, two other doctors have 
indicated that surgery is not warranted (Dr. Holbrook and Dr. 
Sanders) . Dr. Holbrook reviewed the applicant's file and concluded 
that the majority of the applicant's problems were not industrial 
in nature. The doctor concluded that additional medical 
examinations or diagnostic studies will not assist in the 
"delineation or management of [the applicant's] problem [in 
connection with the 1989 injury....M Exhibit D-l at 67. 
Contrary to the view of Dr. Holbrook, and others, is that of 
a treating chiropractic physician, Dr. Wageman, who believed that 
the applicant suffered "...an exacerbation of his post-traumatic 
injuries sustained in the original accident..." of 1989. Exhibit 
A-l. We have concluded that the specialists who determined that 
the applicant's problems were not industrial in nature outweigh the 
opinion of Dr. Wageman. 
The ALJ concluded that the applicant had failed to sustain his 
burden of proof that he was further entitled to TTC or to medical 
expense benefits. There is substantial evidence in the file in 
light of the entire record to show that the applicant's continuing 
problems result from conditions unrelated to the industrial 
accident. Thus, the applicant has failed to show medical and legal 
causation. Under these circumstances, no medical panel is 
necessary. 
The file shows that two doctors considered the applicant to be 
medically stable during the period that the applicant claims 
additional TTC. As a result, they had released the applicant to 
work. It is clear that when an injured worker is released from 
temporary total disability status that TTC should no longer be 
received. Booms v. Rapp Construction. 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 
1986). 
The applicant's argument that he was still within the 
diagnostic stages of treatment is contrary to the evidence. Six 
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specialists have reviewed his case over time, and the applicant has 
had numerous diagnostic tests completed. None of the specialists 
with the possible exception of Dr. Hunter have concluded that 
surgery is warranted or possible. Dr. Holbrook, for example, 
concluded that no further examinations or diagnostic tests were 
warranted. This statement shows that the diagnostic period was 
complete. 
This case is complicated by the applicant's pre-existing 
medical problems, and by his limitation on medical choices forced 
upon him by AIDS. In addition, the applicant suffered two 
subsequent nonindustrial accidents which can be considered to be 
intervening and causally contributing events to the applicant's 
continuing back problems. 
In connection with the permanent partial impairment rating, 
the applicant argues that he should be given a higher rating since 
Dr. Sanders indicated that a 15 percent rating was appropriate 
since the applicant could not work. The applicant also cited Dr. 
Capel as support for this contention that the rating previously 
determined at five percent was too low. We note that the applicant 
was paid for his permanent partial impairment compensation. We 
agree with the ALJ that a five percent impairment is reasonable for 
an unoperated disc problem based upon the Guides to the Evaluation 
of Permanent Impairment. Table 53 (3d ed. rev. 1990) published by 
the American Medical Association. 
The bald statement by Dr. Sanders, in connection with his 
assertion that a 15 percent rating was appropriate, was supported 
by absolutely no medical analysis or logic. We need some 
justification, and in the absence of such, we cannot speculate. In 
the case of Dr. Capel, there is no statement by him as to any 
appropriate rating, other than a statement that the adjustor had 
decided upon a five percent rating. We therefore conclude that the 
evidence does not support the applicant in this regard. 
Under the circumstances, we conclude that the ALJ's findings, 
conclusions of law, and order were based upon substantial evidence 
in light of the entire record, and the legal conclusions were 
correct. The applicant has failed to prove his case. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge 
dated June 29, 1992 is affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
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Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-
16. The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a 
transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes. 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
cTWIUMilW 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
V 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
Certified this^^J^ay of (},^J/ 1992. 
ATTEST: 
Patricia 0. Ash 
Commission Secretary 
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290 East 4000 North 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Michael Dyer 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Lisa-Michele Church 
Administrative Law Judge 
Denis Ashcroft 
330 South Mian 
St. George UT 84770 
Liberty Mutual Insurance 
P. 0. Box 45440 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0440 
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A D D E N D U M "F 
JOHN M. SANDERS, M. O. 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
Adult Neyrosur&ry 
166 EAST S900 SOUTH, SUITE BI04 
MURRAY, UTAH B4IQ7 
October 7, 1991 
To Whom it May Concern: 
This is a note regarding my patient, Dennis Ashcroft, 
whom I have seen in consultation at the request of Dr. 
Ross McNaught. It is my opinion that because he is 
unable to return to his usual work that he should have 
been given a disability rating of fifteen percent on 
that basis alone. 
Yours truly, 
JOHN M. SANDERS, M.D. 
JMS:am 
A D D E N D U M "G" 
BOYD G. HOLBROOK. M.D. 
ORTHOPAEDIC EVALUATION 
1431 PENROSE DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84103 
TELEPHONE (801) 3 5 5 - 0 1 5 4 
April 10, 1992 
Michael E. Dyer, Attorney 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
Key Bank Tower 
50 South Main 7th Floor 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Re: Denis B. Ashcroft 
Ashcroft v. Airfax Express 
Claim No.: WC667-037046 
Inj: 8/25/89 
Your File No.: 8871-244 
Dear Mr. Dyer: 
At your request I have reviewed this medical file with partic-
ular reference to the complex matters that you would like to 
resolve as presented in your history and questions contained 
in your cover latter. 
REVIEW OF FILE: 
The employer's first report of injury dated 9-27-89 indicates 
that this 40 year old truck driver was injured 9-25-89 unload-
ing freight when he twisted his back. 
He last worked the following day and consulted Dr. M. K. McGreg-
or September 28, 1989 with acute low back pain and profound 
muscle spasm in all directions and pain radiating down to the 
midposterior thigh. It notes "injury to lower back while unload-
ing a trailer". 
10-20-89 He was seen by Donald G. Bliss, M.D. who completed a 
comprehensive evaluation. MHe was lifting boxes while unloading 
a truck on 9-25-89 when he had a sudden severe pain in his back. 
The pain was like a "ripping sensation" and he had a hot burning 
sensation going up into his neck". The pain was so severe he 
went to the emergency room. He has gradually improved with 
treatment but suddenly worse six days ago radiating into the 
left and then the right leg. He has had some intermittent minor 
low back pain on occasion with work in the past. On examination 
he found a slight list to the left. Some difficulty arising from 
the bent position and SLR 45 degrees. Reflexes, sensation and 
motor power normal but not tested in detail. X-rays felt to be 
normal. CT scan 10-17-89 shows a symmetrical central bulge at 
the L-3-4 disc with some compromise of the spinal canal but no 
root impingement. He recommended conservative treatment but noted 
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and continued under the care of Dr. Bliss with bilateral leg pain 
severely aggravated my myelogram. He had mild persistent pares-
thesia in his toes. Myelogram and CT show significant disc bulg-
ing at three levels but the spinal canal is fairly capacius with-
out specific nerve root involvement. 
2-1-90 He was evaluated by Dr. Gerald Moress. His back pain is al-
most gone and he only notices it now when bends over or does some 
lifting. Beginning in October he started having impotence. He 
has now noticed some tingling in the upper extremities. He found 
no evidence of spinal stenosis and sensory findings in upper and 
lower extremities. He believed the pathology was within the cer-
vical cord, either a hard disc or some demyelating disease and 
recommended complete myelography and CSF studies. 
26 February 1990 MRI of the cervical spine with the following im-
pression: 
1. Multilevel cervical spine disease (narrowing including for-
aminal narrowing and prominence of the facet joints. 
2. Small herniated discs at C-4-5 and C-6-7 levels. 
3. Mild concentric posterior bulge at C-5-6 level. 
4. Mild to moderate narrowing at the intervertebral foramina 
at multiple levels as described. 
2-27-90 Dr. Bliss recommended review with Dr. Moress. Patient 
clearly interprets all of his problems as stemming from his recent 
accident although multiple level disc disease indicates that he 
has had pre-existing problems and in addition, back pain is not 
his major complaint at this time. 
March 22, 1990 he was examined by Neal C. Capel, M.D. who per-
formed a complete study. He has burning discomfort from D-7 - L-2, 
midline in both right and left paravertebral and ache in posterior 
thighs to the knees and calves with numbness. He further described 
his symptoms and x-rays. His diagnosis was acute low back strain 
and sprain with dysesthesiasbut no definite root signs with multi-
ple segment disc protrusions most prominently 5-S-l with degener-
ative disc segments. Psychosocial changes are quite prominent 
in the clinical context. He has not moved toward employability 
in his mind at all and has a passive approach. Most of the changes 
pre-existed the accident date. He should have a vigorous condit-
ioning program followed by a rating of 5% impairment of the whole 
person. He is not a candidate for surgical intervention and fur-
ther treatment measures or evaluation measures would probably best 
be applied to psychodynamic study and psychiatric consultation 
as he believes these factors are impacting his disability. 
He subsequently was on an exercise program and taking architect-
viral drafting at Dixie College. He continued with moderate sympt-
,^ 4-v* .^ .^i^ 4-„,. ^ ^^^+.4^^
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and worked in his father's grocery store. His back did fairly 
well, but his legs got tired as he was on his feet all day on 
concrete. He is back in school again now. 
11-13 He had the flu in the last 2 to 3 weeks and has not been 
carrying out his proper rehabilitation program. 
11-29-90 New episode. On Sunday last, November 25th the patient 
picked firewood with sudden onset of low back pain more on the 
right. His diagnosis was facet syndrome and low back strain. 
He worked in his parent's grocery store about a month at Christ-
mas time, has difficulty straightening up, has had psychological 
counseling and was again noted to have normal objective examinat-
ion with subjective complaints. He recommended he continue his 
exercise program. By 3-15-91 he was getting along reasonably 
well until March 14th when he bent down to clean manure from his 
dog and sudden pain in the low back and trouble standing up. 
Bed rest was recommended. 
9-26-91 He was in requesting that Dr. Capel relate the lifting 
of firewood episode November 25th to the accident of 9-25-89. 
He has been seeing other doctors for MRl and surgical considerat-
ion. "I have, of course, made that decision long ago". 
MRI 4 October 1991 with the following impression: 
1. Multiple degenerative disc disease with Grade II central 
bulge L-2-3, Grade I-XI central bulge L-3-4 and L-4-5, and 
Grade I central and slightly to the right central bulge 
L-4-S-1. 
2. Borderline to moderate central spinal stenosis L-2-3. 
3. Mild facet arthritis multiple levels with mild left foraminal 
stenosis L-5-S-1. 
Willard S* Hunter, M.D., Phoeniz, Arizona reported October 14, 1991 
an absence of his right ankle reflex not previously noted, limitat-
ion of straight leg raising at 30 degrees on the right and 50 de-
grees on the left, decreased sensation outer aspect of the right 
foot and rather severe cervical disc disease which cannot be treat-
ed except by an open operative intervention. Because of the recent 
change he recommended Chymofast test. I think he now has a herniat-
ed disc at L-5-S-1. I advised that he could be injected. 
Dr. Hunter later noted that the decision regarding surgical inter-
vention is affected by his HIV status. Also, would mean more 
caution for hospital personnel. 
May 8, 1991 office consultation by D. R. McNaught is out of chrono-
logical order here. He again performed a complete evaluation. He 
is tired of living with the complaints and being unable to sleep 
at night although severe pain does not appear to be his major pro-
blem. The left calf is 1 cm smaller than the right. There is tend-
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erness. Reflexes normal. Slight weakness dorsiflecion both great 
toes. Reduced sensation bilaterally L-5 and in the calf and lat-
eral border of feet which is quite numb, extending into the fifth 
toes of both feet. He reviewed the x-rays. He felt he did not 
have severe sciatica but ongoing complaints presumably due to at 
least significant bulging of lumbar discs primarily L-4,5 and per-
haps some at the L-S level. It is doubtful he is a surgical cand-
idate but does not want to go on living with his present complaints. 
He suggested possible epidural steroid injections if a new MRI is 
normal. He also suggested the possibility of Chymopapain injection. 
August 9, 1991 he was seen in consultation by John M. Sanders, M.D. 
who noted at the beginning his history seems to be fairly straight 
forward dating back to 1989 when he was unloading a truck and fur-
ther reviewed the history. Nothing has given him any sustained re-
lief. He has nothing to gain financially from having a surgical 
procedure done. I would have given the patient a 15% disability 
rating on the basis of his inability to return to his usual work. 
I think he got a 5% disability rating. (This clearly demonstrates 
a wide spread problem - the lack of understanding of rating of per-
manent physical impairment in industrial cases.) 
He performed straight leg raising reasonably well. Reflexes were 
normal. Some sensory difference on alternate sides with difficulty 
knowing how to evaluate that. No atrophy. Motor power apparently 
normal. He reviewed his films and does not see a surgical lesion. 
In the lumbar region he has considerable fullness of the disc at 
L-3-4, 4-5 and L-5-S-1 but the nerve outlets seem to be satisfact-
ory. He was still concerned they may be missing some neurological 
problem and he may see another neurologist or return to Dr. Moress. 
He did note a possibility of Chymopapain injection and/or aspirat-
ion of the disc spaces because he doesn't have a focal lump of disc 
that would be missed by those procedures. "Those are procedures 
that I have not been pleased with as I have seem them from this 
point in time but some people have done them and in their hands 
have reported good results so I' 11 leave that evaluation to you and 
someone else who sees him that might do those procedures) 
October 23, 1991 Dr. Sanders further reported that MRI didn't 
really show what he considered to be a specific surgical lesion 
though there are clearly some problems at multiple levels. None 
of them seem significant to warrant surgical intervention at the 
present time. 
SPECIAL STUDIES: 
9-28-89 X-rays of the lumbar spine were interpreted by Dr. McGregor 
as normal. 
10-17-89 CT lumbar spine Dixie Medical Center disc bulging at three 
levels with some decrease in AP diameter at L-3-4. The bulge at 
this level is in a symmetrical fashion. At L-4-5 there is some 
posterior symmetrical bulge and at L-5-S-1 some symmetrical bulge 
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of the thecal sac or nerve roots. There does appear to be a degen-
erative disc with vacuum phenomena at L-5-S-1. The above findings 
are somewhat equivocal. 
12-19-89 Lumbar myelogram with CT scan Dixie Medical Center. Bulg-
ing discs at multiple levels with slight nerve root asymmetry at 
L-5-S-1 on the myelogram. With CT there was noted to be bulging 
at L-2-3. At L-3-4 there was mild impression of the anterior aspect 
of the thecal sac but no focal protrusion to suggest herniation 
and no encroachment of nerve roots. At L-4-5 there was disc degen-
eration vacuum phenomenon with no impingement. At L-5-S-1 there 
is disc space narrowing and degeneration and vacuum phenomenon. 
With the bulging there is slight asymmetry to the right which en-
croaches on the right first sacral root slightly. This should be 
correlated with clinical symptoms but is suggestive of focal hern-
iation at L-5-S-1 and could account for a right S-l radiculopathy. 
2-26-90 MRI of the cervical spine performed at Utah Valley Hospital 
showed significant findings but does not require further considerat-
ion at this time. 
5-7-91 Lumbar spine CT Valley View Medical Center showed degenerat-
ive disc disease at L-5-S-1 with narrowing the disc space and gas 
in the disc. The posterior disc margin has a smooth, mild poster-
ior bulge, without herniation. 
Posterior disc bulging is demonstrated at L-3-4 and 4-5 but this 
appears to be on a degenerative basis without actual herniation. 
10-2-91 X-rays lumbar spine Utah Valley Hospital demonstrate mild 
changes at L-4-5 and L-5-S-1. 
10-4-91 MRI lumbar spine Cottonwood Hospital shows multi-level disc 
disease with bulging at the four lower levels. 
L-2-3 disc is desiccated with central bulging, flattening of the 
thecal sac and moderate spinal stenosis. 
L-3-4 focal central bulging with desiccated disc and minimal flat-
tening of the thecal sac. 
L-4-5 disc is desiccated with focal central bulging. 
L-5-S-1 disc is desiccated with focal grade I - II central disc 
bulge slightly asymmetric to the right without extruded fragment 
or nerve root comprssion. There is no significant compression of 
the thecal sac. Minimal foraminal stenosis is present slightly 
greater on the left but no definite nerve root impingement is 
apparent. 
Degenerative changes were noted at all levels. 
22 January 1992 lumbar discography assessment: 
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Internally disrupted discs with sizable posterior protrusions 
from L-3 through S-l. The L-4-5 and L-5-S-1 levels appear to 
be the most significant. Never the less, typical reproduct-
ion of the patientfs usual leg pain was not achieved. The 
patient did have his typical back pain which, by his own 
admission, is his least pain with injection at the L-4-5 
level. 
DISCUSSION: 
There are those individuals who seek interminably more and more 
medical care as a solution to their problem. Medicine cannot solve 
all problems. Doctors cannot solve all problems. Surgery cannot 
solve all problems. 
This man does have significant multi-level cervical disc disease 
that is not related to his industrial injury and is not being con-
sidered for any possible surgical treatment and appears to be a 
relatively minor portion of his symptom complex. 
Major problem hinges on the lumbar area. 
In your letter you suggest that the L-3-4 disc was the one that 
was being considered for treatment but ray review of this case indic-
ates that the L-5-S-1 is the disc being singled out for treatment. 
There is no question but what multiple studies have been performed 
which in general all agree with each other. There have been no 
specific new revelations by any succeeding tests and these have 
been done because the patient has seen more and more doctors who 
felt more and more tests should be required. If one continues to 
see an unending string of doctors almost an unending therapy pro-
gram will be prescribed and tests will be repeated over and over 
to ensure that something has not been missed. Once a person has 
seen two competent physicians it is almost never that any significant 
pathology that is different is going to be uncovered by a third. 
Thus repeated medical evaluations becomes a goal in itself in a 
desperate search by the patient who is unable to say enough is 
enough and to accept the diagnosis, the prognosis, and more par-
ticularly accept his role as the patient. It appears that this 
person has been unwilling to do this but he is looking for some 
doctor to solve his problem. One hears of these rare and magical 
cases that are reported and continue to give all persons hope, 
but this is not realistic. This man has had every benefit of 
medical care and evaluation having been seen and evaluated and in 
some instances treated by five specialists prior to seeing Dr. 
Hunter. 
Dr. Hunter has extensive experience in Chymopapain injections and 
was, in fact, personally one of the very early persons to receive 
this treatment and was gratified by the results. In general, 
after extensive publicity the procedure has receded to where it 
is now seldom performed. Newer procedures such as percutaneous 
discectomy and suction discectomy have come along and they are be-
ing tried as well. Anything that is new is good and everybody 
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wants the new thing whether it is proven to be as good or better 
than the old thing or not. 
Dr. Hunter is the only one of these five previous physicians who 
has really had any kind of feeling that surgical treatment could 
actually be recommended though Dr. McNaught and Dr. Sanders did 
mention it as a possible consideration. I suspect that this was 
primarily prompted by the encouragement or insistence of the pat-
ienlfc. I may not be properly characterizing their opinion regard-
ing Chemonucleolysis in this patient. Thus, I don't know if his 
referral to Dr. Hunter was really initiated by his attending phy-
sician's here or was more or less requested or demanded by the pat-
ient. 
Dr. Hunter is the only one who found any reflex changes and he 
is the only one who has felt that there was any real surgical 
conclusion to be drawn from the sensory pattern that this man 
demonstrates. If one goes all the way back to the time he was 
under the care of Dr. Capel and reads the last few notes of Dr. 
Capel it still very clearly states this man's status and I don't 
believe that all of the other evaluations and studies have chang-
ed that. 
It is difficult to delineate the level of his pain but I would 
surmise that his fears regarding his physical condition have over-
whelmed him. That he may not be dealing well with his HIV status 
and that he may well be transferring his health care concerns to 
something that he can specifically identify in his back and hope 
that some magic is going to significantly improve his condition. 
I am not sure how strongly Dr. Hunter feels about this surgical 
condition and how strongly he is urging this because he states 
"I think he now has a herniated disc at L-5-S-1 and advised that 
he could be injected" (emphasis added). This gives this reviewer 
more of an impression that Dr. Hunter would be acquiescing in the 
wishes and desires of the patient more than he is actively pro-
moting this procedure himself. 
There are two additional factors in this case. 11-25-90 the pat-
ient had a significant new episode. Prior to this it would appear 
that he was getting along quite well and was definitely substanti-
ally worse following that episode. 
3-15-91 It was noted he was getting along reasonably well until 
March 14, 1991 when he bent down to clean manure and had sudden 
pain in the low back and trouble standing up representing another 
further significant episode though not really associated with 
undue stress or strain. Thus, there are two significant episodes 
thathave continued to contribute to his problem subsequent to the 
industrial accident though there was not shown to be any substant-
ial change in the specific diagnostic studies from the time before 
until the time after these two episodes. 
One should additionally note the lack of specificity of the disco-
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gram as to the delineating the level of the problem to which 
treatment should be directed. 
ANSWERS TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS: 
1. No further additional, medical treatment is reasonable and nec-
essary for Mr. Ashcroft as a direct result of the industrial event 
of September 25, 19 89. 
2. The proposed Chymopapain injection is not a reasonably necess-
ary medical treatment in light of Mr. Ashcroft1s overall medical 
condition and more specifically in regards to these two specific 
factors: 
a. There is diffuse degenerative disc disease involving 
four levels of his lumbar spine. 
b. Even the worst reading relative to the L-5-S-1 disc 
interprets this as a rather benign protrusion or disc 
herniated that could not reasonably be expected to 
compress the nerve roots on both sides. This would not 
explain apparent weak dorsiflexion of the toes and sub-
jective paresthesia and would not appear to be sufficient 
to recommend or urge surgery. Dr. Hunter has based his 
conclusions regarding surgery a good deal on the absence 
of his right ankle reflex which appears to be a change 
since his last prior examination by Dr. Sanders associat-
ed with limitation of straight leg raising and decrease 
sensation on the outer aspect of the right foot. 
In view of the extensive studies and evaluations that this patient 
has had it does not appear that more medical examinations or more 
diagnostic studies will assist in the delineation or management 
of his problem. If one felt compelled to obtain additional evaluat-
ion to help clear the air then perhaps a re-evaluation by Dr. Mor-
ess who saw him some time ago and could review all of his subsequent 
radiographic studies if he felt it would be helpful in additon to 
the reports. 
3. If Mr. Ashcroft undergoes the Chymopapain injection in any 
event this is generally considered to be a rather benign operative 
procedure with a low complication rate and a rather low morbidity 
rate but sometimes temporary total disability will continue beyond 
three months and sometimes associated with rather severe muscle 
spasm and extended aggravation of symptoms. Frequently there is 
no improvement. The additional problem is that a multi-level disc 
disease and the inability to be certain that one is attacking an 
area that is the primary cause of his pain in view of all of the 
studies including the discography. Even "good" relief at this 
level may constitute very little improvement in the total picture. 
Under no circumstances would a fusion be considered in view of his 
other medical conditions as well as the extensive nature of his 
lumbar spine disease. 
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There is increased surgical risks with Aids but a simple Chymopapain 
injection would appear to carry minimal additional risks. 
4. Most of those who have examined this applicant have felt that 
his neurological symptoms are primarily not related to a protruded 
or herniated intervertebral- disc and thus not specifically related 
to the alleged injury of 9-25-89. 
If I can be of any further assistance in this complex matter please 
contact me further. 
Very si|raerely, 
Boyd G. Holbrook, M.D. 
BGH:hh 
enclosure 
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Bruce J. Wilson (3504) 
290 East 4000 North 
Provo, Utah 84604 
(801) 226-0564 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Denis Ashcroft 
Applicant, 
vs 
Airfax Express Inc. 
Defendant, 
APPLICANT, Denis Ashcroft through his counsel, Bruce Wilson, 
hereby requests this matter be reviewed and reversed for the 
following basis: 
1. There were two doctors giving a rating of 10% by Dr. 
McNaught, (See exhibit 1) and 15% by Dr. Sanders, (See exhibit 2) 
and the ALJ rejected them in favor of a two year old 5% rating 
done by the "Liberty Mutual account manager" (See Exhibit 3) 
based on lack of credibility of the Dr. Sanders. 
2. Rule R490-1-9(A)(l)(a) Says: 
"A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge 
where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must 
be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
a. Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical 
impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole 
person,ff 
(Emphasis added) 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Motion for Review or 
Reconsideration 
It is contrary to justice to make a credibility finding 
against a medical opinion of a doctor who is not allowed to be 
present to testify. Rule R490-1-9 makes medical panels mandatory 
for resolving medical disputes for that very reason. 
3. The ALJ also did not take into account the fact that the 
treating doctors were still actively considering alternative 
procedures, including chymopapain and various surgeries. She 
either lost or ignored the chiropractor's results that he was 
improving with chiropractic treatment (exhibit 4). The question 
of Maximum Medical Improvement should also be considered by a 
panel. 
4. This is not a case of no objective evidence. There are 
several radiographically verified discs injuries. Surgery was a 
clear possibility but for the complication of the AIDS. This is 
not a chronic pain without objective evidence case and should not 
be treated as such. 
WHEREFORE, Applicant requests the ALJfs findings be reversed 
and the matter be sent to a medical panel, as the ALJ indicated 
at the hearing she intended to do. 
Respectfully^ submitted, 
Bruce Wilson 
